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In this paper we analyze the relationship between technological greening, eco-efficiency and no-
regret strategies. By using a simple theoretical model, we evaluate the effects of technological 
greening on creation value, pollution level, and eco-efficiency. We show three contrasting effects 
of technological greening. First, technological greening may increase the pollution of a firm, and 
also of the whole industry. Second, the indicator of eco-efficiency can be misleading because it 
may improve in situations where pollution increases and/or profit decreases after technological 
greening.  Third,  technological  greening  that  induces  an  improvement  of  the  eco-efficiency 
indicator does not necessarily lead to a no-regret strategy. As a result, the indicator should not be 
used for decision making. 
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In order to provide a comprehensive evaluation of both the environmental and the
economic performance of rms, the World Business Council for Sustainable Develop-
ment (WBCSD) elaborated in 1991 the concept of eco-eciency, to be understood as
the ratio of product value over environmental pressure (Schmidheiny, 1992). Broadly
dened, eco-eciency is also a management philosophy that encourages business to
look for environmental improvements that yield joint economic benets. As an ex-
ample, Schmidheiny (1992) denes eco-ecient companies as \those which create
ever more useful products and services while continuously reducing their consump-
tion of resources and their pollution". De Simone and Popo (1997) extend the
scope of this denition with four criteria: the denition of targets to reach, the
dynamic assessment of environmental performance, the broad integration of envi-
ronmental impacts, and the awareness of the rm's impact on the Earth's carrying
capacity. Basically, the underlying idea behind all these denitions is that it is a
good thing to produce more desirable output with less undesirable output.
In fact, very few papers in the literature address the issue of eco-eciency from
a theoretical perspective. Our purpose in this paper is to understand the relation-
ship between technological greening, eco-eciency, and no-regret strategies. Let
us briey dene these three terms. Technological greening simply consists in the
adoption of a less polluting technology. Thus, technological greening is good for the
environment because it reduces the pollution level, but it can be costly to the rm
since an advanced green technology is more expensive than an old dirty one. How-
ever, some authors believe that adopting a clean technology may yield competitive
advantages, which leads on to the concept of no-regret strategy. A no-regret strategy
is a strategy (here, investing or not in a green technology) such that the decrease
in pollution is accompanied by an increase in prot. It can clearly be seen that the
concept of eco-eciency is the nexus of these two previous concepts. Furthermore,
it is even considered by the WBCSD to be a tool for decision-making. Improving
the value of the eco-eciency indicator by technological greening means that more
value is created with less pollution. In this paper we question this idea. Does the
eco-eciency indicator really capture all the eects of technological greening? Can
it help in identifying no-regret decisions? In fact, we will see that the eco-eciency
indicator cannot be trusted.
Two strands of literature are of special relevance to our study. The rst one
deals with the relationship between environmental performance and economic per-
formance. There exist two slightly dierent standpoints. Some authors argue that
2greater environmental performance systematically increases the rm's economic per-
formance. Porter and Van Der Linde (1995), for example, consider that environ-
mental performance is a key opportunity to foster a rm's competitive position, as
it allows for increases in protability or market share. Improving environmental
performance may also lead to benets from a managerial point of view. Hart (1995)
or Russo and Fouts (1997) argue that an environmentally friendly technology may
be a competitive advantage used as a resource-based strategy of the rm. A theoret-
ical rationale for such no-regret options is provided by Br echet and Jouvet (2009).
The idea that greater environmental performance may foster economic performance
has also been stressed by many empirical studies. Some papers show that better
environmental performance increases the rm's value. For example, Dowell et al.,
(2000) show that environmental performance (through compliance with environmen-
tal standards) is protable to the rm. King and Lenox (2002) assess the positive
relationship between environmental and economic performance through waste pre-
vention, while Sinkin et al. (2008) study the impacts of ISO 14000 on a rm's value.
Rennings et al. (2006) show the positive eect of environmental innovation on eco-
nomic performance. All these results illustrate the idea that technological greening
makes the rm better o, which coincides with an improvement in eco-eciency.
On the other hand, some authors consider that an improvement in environmental
performance does not systematically lead to an increase in economic performance
e.g. Lankoski (2006). Palmer et al. (1995) show that stringent environmental
regulation reduces a rm's prot because of the cost of environmental compliance.
Boons and Wagner (2009) question the current assessment which states that innova-
tion has an eect only on economic and ecological performance. The authors discuss
the existence of a broader range of actions for innovation that explains this unclear
relationship between innovation, environmental and economic performance. Br echet
and Michel (2007) formally show that the ranking of rms in terms of environmental
performance depends not only on technological choice, but also on market equilib-
rium. In other words, the ranking cannot be reduced to the mere technological
greening issue.
In this paper we formally make the link between technological greening, eco-
eciency and no-regret strategy. Our contribution is to question whether an im-
provement of the eco-eciency indicator due to technological greening necessarily
leads to an increase in prots and a decrease in pollution. To this end, we develop
a framework to understand the eects of technological greening on a rm's prot,
a rm's emissions, emissions at the market level, and on the WBCSD indicator of
eco-eciency. By using a simple theoretical model we show that for a high tax level
3that gives a positive incentive for a less polluting technology, technological green-
ing does not necessarily reduce emissions, either at the rm level or at the market
level. However, the eco-eciency indicator might improve, thus providing a wrong
signal to decision-makers. These results do question the reliability of the indica-
tor for decision-making. Indeed, we show that, after technological greening, the
eco-eciency indicator can increase when the rm experiences a prot loss and/or
when the emission level increases. Finally, we show that the improvement of the
eco-eciency indicator is a necessary but not a sucient condition for no-regret
strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we propose an overview of
the use of the eco-eciency indicator in business practice. In Section 3 the setting
is presented. Section 4 analyzes the eects of technological greening on prot and
emissions at the rm level. Section 5 discusses the cases of no-regret strategy and
Section 6 analyzes the eects of technological greening on the eco-eciency indicator.
The last section is the conclusion.
2 Eco-eciency in practice
Before beginning the theoretical analysis it is of interest to see to what extent the
concept of eco-eciency, and the related indicators, are used in practice.
Private and public sectors make wide use of eco-eciency as an indicator to
support decision-making. As guidance for managers and policy-makers in measur-
ing and assessing a rm's performance, many institutional reports are based on the
WBCSD concept, see e.g. Schmidheiny (1992), WBCSD (2000), Verfaillie and Bid-
well (2001). Some institutions further develop managerial specicities linked to the
indicator so as to widen its scope, for example in nance, accountancy or produc-
tion areas. For example, the United Nations Conference on Trade And Development
(Sturm et al., 2003) and the widely used Global Reporting Initiative (GRI, 2006)
provide a method to report environmental performance with respect to nancial
performance in an accountancy framework. Interestingly, both reports are divided
into categories of materials (water use, energy use, global warming contribution,
etc.) and assessment areas (economic, labor, environmental, social or human rights
indicators).
At the business level, Ditz and Ranganathan (1997) wrote a report for the World
Resources Institute that highlights the use of intensity measures for internal compar-
isons, but without providing any detail on the calculations. In addition to its 1991
seminal report, the WBCSD has also developed a classication of indicators into
4core and supplemental subdivisions, as presented by Verfaillie and Bidwell (2001).
The rst category of indicators is implementable, which makes comparisons between
sectors or rms feasible. The second category consists in business-specic indica-
tors which are designed to be used for internal purposes or for comparisons between
plants in the same industry. This suggests that the generic concept of eco-eciency
cannot be generalized or, to put it in dierent terms, that eco-eciency is sector-
specic. We shall return to this point. In Canada, the National Round Table on the
Environment and the Economy (NRTEE, 2001) has created a workbook dening
indicators according to the life cycle approach (from cradle to grave). It classies
the indicators in energy use, waste intensity and water intensity. The eco-eciency
ratios are then calculated as the amount of resource consumed or as undesirable out-
put over production level. See also Callens and Tyteca (1999) for more developed
sets of indicators.
Finally, there also exists a literature on eco-eciency that focuses on the im-
plementation aspects at the company level. For example, BASF (Saling et al.,
2002) and Akzo Nobel (Cramer and van Lochem, 2001) have both published case
studies on the eco-eciency analysis of their production processes. Both use the
eco-eciency indicator in a broad sense, including life-cycle analysis. They have
developed measurements for internal comparison among their own products. The
methodology is not the same in the two case studies. BASF assesses eco-eciency
with diamond diagrams, because they want to encompass multi-pollutant products.
Such a comparison is dicult because of the multidimensional problem (weightings,
pollution preferences: is it better to produce a good that emits a lot of sulfur dioxide
and little carbon dioxide, or the contrary?). The other rm, Akzo Nobel, assesses
eco-eciency by comparing six pilot projects corresponding to six business units
dierentiated by their innovation level. Both studies make use of eco-eciency for
internal comparison.
3 The setting
Our purpose is to develop a simple theoretical setting in order to understand the
eects of technological greening at the rm and market levels. We consider a static,
short term analysis. The industry is composed of a continuum of n heterogeneous
rms. Each rm is indexed by i 2 F : f1;:::;ng and uses a production function
yi =
p
xi, where yi is the output and xi is the input. Firms operate under perfect
competition. The output price is p and the input price is normalized to 1. Let us
denote by ei the pollution level of rm i. Pollution is a joint product of output,
5ei = yi=bi, where bi is the inverse of the emission/output intensity. We assume
that rms acquired their initial technology before the enforcement of a regulation
on environment. So the rms are dierentiated by their polluting intensity 1=bi.
By convention, the most polluting technology is b1 = 1 and the cleanest one is
bn = bmax > 1. From now on, the regulator levies a uniform emission tax t on
pollution. Firm i's problem writes as follows:
max
feig
i = pyi   xi   tei;8i 2 F:
The problem is solved by substituting yi by ei. The rst-order condition gives the
rm's optimal emission level (e
i), which yields the expressions for output (y
i) and
prot (






















The impact of the emission tax on rm i's prot is 4i = 
i(t > 0)   
i(t = 0) =
t(t   2bip)=4b2
i. This expression shows that two eects interplay. On the one hand,
the higher the tax level, the lower the prot (which is not surprising). But, on the
other hand, for a given tax level, the lower bi, the higher the prot decrease due to
the tax. This means that a rm with a greener technology (i.e. a higher bi) will
experience a lower prot decrease if the tax is implemented. Does this suggests that,
under some tax regulation, a rm always has an incentive to green its technology?
And is it the case that technological greening is always good for the environment?
In the sequel we will see that it is not always the case.
4 The eects of technological greening at the rm
level
In this section we shall analyze the eects of technological greening at the rm
level. Let us start by being precise about the terminology. We formally dene
technological greening as a marginal increase in bi. Such an increase represents the
adoption of a less polluting (or `green') technology per unit of output. Technological
greening is not free. It raises a cost given by abi, with a > 0. Because we consider
6marginal improvements of the technology, this cost corresponds to a marginal cost
of adoption. This adoption cost is larger when the technology is already very clean
(bi is high). So the whole analysis will be conducted in marginal terms. We shall
provide a comparative static analysis about the eect of improving a technology on
prot and emissions.
4.1 The eects on rm's prot
The eect of technological greening on rm i's prot is given by the rst derivative
of equation (2) with respect to the technological parameter bi, net of the adoption














i(t;bi) = 0 provides us with an iso-prot frontier on which rm
i's prot is unchanged after technological greening. The existence of real roots
for '
i(t;bi) = 0, denoted by ti and  ti, relies on the assumption that a, the scale
parameter of the greening cost, is not too large. Formally, we must have a <
p2=8b2
i;8i 2 F. The iso-prot frontier is described by functions that are dened by
the roots of '
i(t;bi) = 0, in (bi;t). In this space rm i's prot increases or decreases
after technological greening, depending on (i) its initial technology, (ii) whether the
emission tax is inside or outside a frontier t(a;bi;p) dened by t and  t. This leads
us to our rst result.
Proposition 1 Firm i's prot can increase or decrease after technological greening,
depending on the tax level and rm i's initial technology.
Proof See Appendix A.1
The rationale behind this rst proposition is twofold. Firstly, greening the tech-
nology entails a cost for the rm, and the cleaner the initial technology, the higher
the cost increase. When the technology is already very ecient (large bi) it may
be too costly to improve it further in comparison with the savings on the tax bill.
This is why prot can decrease when bi is initially high (this corresponds to the
right side of the 'i frontier). Secondly, the higher the tax on pollution, the stronger
the incentive for technological greening. Upgrading the technology is all the more
protable as the tax is high. However, for a very high tax level a rm with a low
bi may also experience a prot decrease. In such a situation, the emission reduction
due to the technological greening does not compensate for the tax burden. To re-
main protable, the rm should make a stronger innovation eort (even greater bi).
7Naturally, these two eects interplay and it may well be the case that the frontier
'i is wide enough to make technological greening protable for all initial technology
levels.
4.2 The eects on rm's pollution
Let us now turn to the eect of technological greening on pollution. At the rm's
optimum the emission level is given by equation (1). As previously, the eect of
technological greening on rm's pollution is given by the rst derivative of this












The frontier  
i(t;bi) = 0 is such that technological greening has no impact on
rm i's pollution level. It gives us an iso-emission function, ~ ti = bip=2. Firm i's
pollution increases or decreases with technological greening depending on (i) its
initial technology and, (ii) whether the tax is above or below a frontier t(bi;p)
given by ~ t = bip=2. The following proposition summarizes the eect of technological
greening on rm i's pollution.
Proposition 2 Firm i's pollution can increase or decrease after technological green-
ing, depending on the tax level and rm i's initial technology.
Proof See appendix A.2
This result may seem counterintuitive. Actually, it may well be the case that,
after having adopted a cleaner technology, the rm pollutes more. For a given tax
level, unambiguously, technological greening reduces rm's emission output inten-
sity. But it also allows for an increase in the marginal productivity of pollution,
which results in an increase in the rm's production, ceteris paribus. The increase
in output level can oset the improvement in pollution intensity, so that the rm's
pollution level can increase. Such a situation is known in the energy economics lit-
erature as the rebound eect (see, e.g., Greening et al., 2000; Berkhout et al., 2000).
Gains in the eciency of energy consumption can result in an eective reduction in
the per unit price of energy services or an increase in market share such that, by the
end, energy consumption increases, partially osetting the impact of the eciency
gain. So the rebound eet can result from an equilibrium eect through prices, or
through a productive eect. Because all prices are exogenous in our setting, only
the latter eect comes out. Interestingly, this rebound eect appears when the tax
8on pollution is high enough. For a given bi, the higher the tax, the stronger the
reduction of the production cost after technological greening, and thus the stronger
the increase in output.
5 Technological greening and no-regret strategy
At this stage of the paper, the puzzling result is that pollution level can increase after
technological greening at the rm level. We have formally identied the situations for
this to appear. Clearly, one may want to avoid such situations. Among the situations
where pollution decreases (good news), it may happen that prot decreases (bad
news). The purpose of this section is to identify the cases in which technological
greening can yield a `no-regret' strategy, that is, technological greenings leading to
a prot increase and a pollution decrease. In this section we will see that such
no-regret situations happen under dierent conditions at the rm level and at the
aggregate level.
5.1 No regret at the rm level
Could it be possible that a rm has a positive incentive for technological greening
and, by the end, that pollution increases? Conversely, could it be the case that
technological greening reduces emissions while not providing a positive incentive
to the rm? To answer these questions we shall combine the insights from the two
previous analyzes. It is well-established in the literature that a pollution tax provides
positive incentives for technological greening. Following this literature, the higher
the tax, the stronger the incentive (see Requate 1995, 1998). Hereafter, following
Br echet and Jouvet (2008) we will see that it is not necessarily the case.
Our analysis is conducted by using the graphical illustration provided in Figure
1. We restrict ourselves to rms producing a positive output level (y
i(t;bi)  0;8i).
We dene the set domain as the space (t;bi) within the two following frontiers.
The rst frontier, dened by t = bip, is such that rms produce a positive output
level when they are interior to the frontier (i.e. a smaller bi and/or a smaller t).
The second frontier is dened by bmax, the best available technology that has the
lowest emission-output intensity. In Figure 1, one can also see the frontier related
to the incentive for technological greening '
i(a;bi;t) = 0. A rm characterized by
some (t;bi) and located inside the 'i frontier will experience a prot increase after
technological greening. Outside this frontier, the rm will experience a prot loss.
The other frontier,  
i(t;bi) = 0, is also displayed. Below that frontier, the rm's
9emissions decrease after technological greening; above, they increase. This function
















Figure 1: Combination of the eects of technological greening
split the domain into four areas labeled (I), (II), (III) and (IV).
In area (I), polluting emissions decrease with technological greening and prot
increases. Here, technological greening corresponds to a no-regret strategy. In area
(II), the rm experiences the rebound eect: technological greening yields a higher
prot level, but pollution increases too. In this case, the positive incentive to improve
the technology harms the environment. In area (III), polluting emissions decrease
with technological greening, but prot does the same. In this case, the rm has no
incentive for technological greening. At last, in area (IV), emissions increase with
technological greening, but prot level decreases also. In other words, the initial
technology is already ecient, so greening it even further is not protable. This
situation is not desirable because both the environment and the rm are worse-o.
5.2 No regret at the aggregate level
Considering that it may happen that a rm has a positive incentive for technological
greening but also that, as a result, its emission level increases, one may ask about
10the outcome at the market level. If all rms having a positive incentive to green
their technology do it, can it happen that aggregate pollution level increases at the
industry level? Is it possible that the emission increase of some rms is oset by the
emission reduction of some other rms? We already know that pollution increase
(after technological greening) happens for rms with a low bi and when the tax level
is high. So, one way to answer that question is to search whether there exists a
tax level such that technological greening (with a positive incentive) leads to an
increase in the aggregate pollution level. The eect of technological greening on the





Formally, we are looking for a tax level - if it exists - such that technological
greening - with positive incentive - leads to an increase in the aggregate pollution
level. Let us denote by b1 and b2 the technological boundaries within which the
rms have a positive incentive for technological greening (see Section 4.1). Within
these boundaries, for a given tax t, the aggregate eect of technological greening on










As a consequence, aggregate emissions increase if t > pb1(t)b2(t)=(b1(t) + b2(t)).
To understand how this condition shapes the result it is convenient to consider an
numerical example. Let us consider three dierent tax levels such that b1(t) = 1:
t = 3:5, t = 2:5 and t = 1:0. Figure 2 illustrates the eect of technological greening
both on the continuum of rms rm and at the aggregate level.1 The horizontal-
axis represents the continuum of technologies and the vertical axis represents the
variation of the emission level after technological greening. Let b2(t) be the critical
technology below which the incentive is positive. The aggregate variation in pollu-
tion is provided by the integral under and above these curves between b1 and b2. One
can see that, for small and medium tax levels, aggregate emissions decrease after
technological greening. With t = 3:5, the rms that initially had a very polluting
technology (low bi) experience a rebound eect, while the rms with a larger initial
bi pollute less. Aggregate emissions increase after technological greening when the
rst eect dominates the second one.
This result is summarized in the following proposition.
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Figure 2: Eect of technological greening on rm's emissions, for three tax levels
Proposition 3 Aggregate pollution increases after technological greening if the tax
on pollution is high enough.
Two major implications can be drawn from this result. First, it questions the
very concept of clean technology. A rm with a larger bi does not necessarily pollute
less. Besides the mere technological issue (the choice of bi), there exists an econom-
ical issue, that is, the way the rm makes use of the polluting factor within the
production process and on the market. It appears that the relationship between a
tight regulation that provides an incentive for innovation and pollution reduction
is not straightforward. The incentive may be bad for the environment. Second, it
also questions the reliability of the WBCSD eco-eciency indicator in its ability to
detect no-regret strategies. Scrutinizing further this issue is the purpose of our last
section.
6 Is the eco-eciency indicator reliable?
In this section we question the eco-eciency indicator proposed by the WBCSD.
In other words: is this indicator able to detect the situations where technological
greening leads to a no-regret strategy (less pollution, more prot)? The indicator
advised by the WBCSD consists in the ratio of created value over environmental
impact. We shall interpret it as the ratio between prot level and emission level. This
12denition is consistent with current business practices (see Section 2). So we shall




The eect of technological greening on this indicator is given by its rst derivative


















i = 0 provides us with a frontier on which technological greening
does not impact the indicator. This gives us a function  ti = (bip2   4ab3
i)=p, which
is concave to the origin2 and equals zero for bi = p=(2
p
a). Within the frontier,
the indicator increases after technological greening; outside, it decreases. Our last
proposition is thus the following.
Proposition 4 The eco-eciency indicator can increase or decrease after techno-
logical greening, depending on the tax level and the initial technology.
Proof See appendix A.3
To summarize the reliability of the eco-eciency indicator we have gathered the
eects of technological greening on the indicator with those on prot and emissions
of rm i in the same gure. This 
i = 0 frontier divides areas (II) and (III) into
four subdomains that are named (IIa), (IIb), (IIIa), (IIIb). For a given tax level
below the frontier 
i = 0, the eco-eciency indicator increases after technological
greening, above it decreases. Table 1 displays the eects of technological greening
on the two arguments of the eco-eciency indicator; it must be used in combination
with Figure 3.
In area (I) and (IV) the eco-eciency indicator behaves according to the intuition
and gives the right signal to the decision maker. On the one hand, the rm and
the environment are getting better in (I), which means that technological greening
increases prots and decreases pollution (a no-regret strategy). On the other hand,
things are getting worse in (IV) for both the rm and the environment, which is
signaled by the eco-eciency indicator. So both in cases (I) and (IV) the eco-
eciency indicator can be trusted.
Unfortunately, in all other areas the eco-eciency indicator gives a `go' signal
for technological greening, while it worsens the situation both for the rm and for
the environment.
2It belongs to the domain.
13 e Ii
I % & %
IIa % % %
IIb % % &
IIIa & & %
IIIb & & &
IV & % &
Table 1: A comprehensive view of the eects of technological greening - Complement
to Figure 3
Area (II) is mixed: prot and emissions increase with technological greening.
However, this zone is divided into two. In area (IIa), the eco-eciency indicator
gives a positive signal for technological greening, thus giving a wrong information to
decision-makers: the rm will be better-o, but it will pollute more (rebound eect).
The indicator is enhanced because the prot increase is stronger than the emission
increase, and this is due to the high marginal benet of technological greening (high
tax on emission/low initial technology level).
In area (IIb), the eco-eciency indicator gives a `no-go' signal for technological
greening because the emission increase is stronger than the prot increase. In that
case, the indicator decreases despite an increase of prot.
In area (III), both prot and emissions decrease after technological greening.
Again, the eects on eco-eciency splits the zone into two. In areas (IIIa), the
indicator gives a `go' signal. By cleaning its technology the rm will reduce its
emission level (no rebound eect in that area), but it will be worse-o in terms
of prot. The reason here is that the rm is already very clean and the cost of
pollution, relative to the cost of adoption, is not high enough. Adopting a cleaner
technology would be too expensive in comparison with its productive benets. Still,
the indicator gets higher because the emission reduction is stronger than the prot
loss.
In area (IIIb), the indicator gives a `no-go' signal for technological greening
because the prot loss is stronger than the emission reduction. The eco-eciency
indicator decreases despite the emission reduction.





















Figure 3: Global eects of technological greening
Corollary An improvement in the eco-eciency indicator is a necessary but not
a sucient condition for a no-regret strategy.
This latter corollary shows that the eco-eciency indicator, as dened by the
World Business Council, is not an adequate indicator for decision-making, neither
at the rm level nor at the market level.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we provide a framework to understand the eects of technological
greening on rm's prot, rm's emission, market emissions, and on the indicator
of eco-eciency. We show why eco-ecieny is at the nexus between technological
greening (adopting a less polluting technology) and no-regret strategies (lower pol-
lution level and higher prots). With a simple theoretical model we highlight that
technological greening may raise conicting eects. First, a high tax level on pollu-
tion that provides the rm with a positive incentive for technological greening may
also lead to an increase in emissions, both at the rm level or at the market level.
Second, technological greening can lower the rm's prot if the initial technology
15is already very ecient. Third, these conicting eects are not systematically de-
tected by the eco-eciency indicator, as dened by the WBCSD. In other words,
eco-eciency cannot be trusted as an indicator for decision-making. More formally,
we show that eco-eciency is a necessary, but not a sucient condition for iden-
tifying no-regret strategies. It may give a `go' signal to the rm for technological
greening in cases where the rm will experience a prot decrease and a pollution
increase.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The eect of technological greening on prot is given by the rst derivative of the






























This 'i function allows us to dene a frontier on which the eect of technological
greening on the prot level is zero, '
i(bi;t) = 0. There exist cases where real roots of
'
i(bi;t) = 0 do not exist. The very existence of real roots for '
i(bi;t) = 0, denoted
by ti and  ti, relies on the following assumption:
Assumption We suppose a condition on a for which an environmental techno-
logical amelioration allow an improvement of the prot level. Otherwise ti and  ti











Both of the roots belong to the set domain,  ti < ~ t and ti < ~ t. For bi = 1, we have:











p2   16a) < p

































ip2   8ab4 > 0

































ip2   8ab4 < 0
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The eect of technological greening on pollution is given by the rst derivative of














The function ~ ti is linear and increasing in bi.
Location of the frontier within the set domain
A frontier ~ ti =
bip
2 is dened such that the eects of technological greening on
pollution level is null:  
i(bi;t) = 0. Under our assumption this function of iso-
emissions (~ ti =
bip
2 ) belongs to the set domain ~ t1 < t1 , p=2 < p. The function


















































20A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
The eect of technological greening on the eco-eciency indicator is given by the














 pt + bip2   4ab3
i
2(bip   t)




The function  t is increasing and concave in bi and equals zero for bi = p=(2
p
a).
Location of the frontier within the set domain
The frontier  ti =
bip2 4ab3
i
p is such that the eect of technological greening on eco-
eciency indicator level is nill, 
i(bi;t) = 0. This function  ti = (bip2   4ab3
i)=p
belongs to the set domain
t1 >  t1 , p >
p2   4a
p
) 0 >  4a
The function  t = (bip2  4ab3
i)=p for bi = 1 gives us  t = (p2  4a)=p and it is located
between  t1 and ~ t1.











Assuming that a < (p2)=(8b2
i) allows us to set a condition on p for b1. It conrms
that  t1 >  t1: a < (p2)=(8b2
i) , p >
p
8a. Considering this assumption on a we




The function  t(a;bi;p) crosses ~ t(a;bi;p) and thus  t(a;bi;p) and t(a;bi;p) at bi =
p=(
p
8a) (see Appendix A.2) such that
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